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The disputes among the Justices in Chiarella lead us to
doubt that it will be the Supreme Court's last word on Rule
lOb-5.
-Judge J. Skelly Wright, D.C. Circuit, 1983.'
The disputes among the Justices in [Dirks] lead us to
doubt that it will be the Supreme Court's last word on Rule
lOb-5.
-David C. Bayne, S.J, 1994.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Judge J. Michael Luttig and the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals have brought these prophetic doubts parlously close to con-
firmation. The mid-1995 United States v. Bryan3 case has set up a
sharp confrontation among the circuits and in the process inspired
the moribund law of Insider Trading with new life and hope.
Although little noticed in legal commentary,4 Bryan could
* S.J., Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
2. David Cowan Bayne, The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Chestman and the
'Misappropriation Theory,' 43 KAN. L. REv. 79, 134 (1994) [hereinafter Bayne, Mis-
appropriation Theory] (paraphrasing Dirks, 681 F.2d at 837.)
3. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
4. As of this writing Bryan had attracted the attention of Harvard's editors in a
six-page student casenote, Note, Fourth Circuit Rejects Misappropriation Theory of
Rule 10b-5 Fraud Liability, 109 HARV. L. REv. 536 (1995), but research has not dis-
covered a scholarly examination of the case. Meanwhile, Insider Trading commen-
tary continues apace, as the securities-law community remains obviously uncomfort-
able with the status quo: "At least five members of the Supreme Court are willing to
reexamine securities-law issues that appear settled in the lower courts. . . . [The
Court's] decision [in Central Bank] to overturn long-established lower-court prece-
dent will result in more litigation and less predictability under the federal securities
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nonetheless be the most important Insider Trading opinion since
the ill-conceived Chiarella v. United States5 and Dirks v. SEC'
some fifteen years ago. Bryan should at long last force the courts,
the bar, and the Securities and Exchange Commission to clean up
the mess left by the Misappropriation Theory.
But this present commentary has a far broader purpose than
merely prodding the parties to resolve the standoff. This Article is
one in a series of articles7 written with the grandiose but serious
goal of an all-embracing philosophy of the law of Insider Trading.
The articles have been reduced to a hardcover Insider Trading: A
Legal and Moral Treatise, which is awaiting publication.
The series began with a seminal study that supplied the foun-
dation for exactly such a philosophy. Appearing in late 1992, this
elemental work, Insider Trading: The Essence of the Insider's
Duty,8 laid out the rudimentary natural law principles underlying
laws." Arthur F. Mathews & W. Hardy Callcott, Tightening Securities Laws, LEGAL
TIMES, July 25, 1994, at S39, S40 (commenting on Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (concerning private rights of action
for aiding and abetting a Rule 10b-5 violation)).
Recent Insider Trading articles by other authors include, Thomas Lee Hazen,
Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons from the European Community Directive
on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (1992); Roberta S. Karmel, Is
the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995); Michael P. Kenny
& Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Uni-
verse: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139 (1995);
Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REv.
S7 (1993); Steven R. Salbu, Tipper Credibility, Noninformational Tippee Trading,
and Abstention from Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the Insider Trading Laws, 68
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1993) (suggesting abandonment of common law deceit and
adoption of an expanded fraud-on-the-market theory as the basis of Insider Trading
liability); Troy Cichos, Note, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: Its
Past, Present, and Future, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 389 (1995) (calling for regulatory
changes under Rule 10b-5); R. Ren6 Pengra, Note, Insider Trading, Debt Securities,
and Rule 10b-5: Evaluating the Fiduciary Relationship, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1354
(1992); John K. Robinson, Note, A Reconsideration of the Disgorgement Remedy in
Tipper-Tippee Insider Trading Cases, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 432 (1994) (suggesting
that the concept of disgorgement is too loosely applied).
5. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
7. The Insider Trading articles by David Cowan Bayne, S.J., in sequence, are:
Insider Trading: The Essence of the Insider's Duty, 41 KAN. L. REV. 315 (1992)
[hereinafter Bayne, Essence]; The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: 'Disclose or Ab-
stain'?, 42 KAN. L. REV. 75 (1993) [hereinafter Bayne, Disclose or Abstain?]; The In-
sider's Natural-Law Duty: Chiarella and the 'Fiduciary' Fallacy, 19 J. CORP. L. 681
(1994) [hereinafter Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy]; The Insider's Natural-Law Duty:
Dirks, the Son of Chiarella, 19 J. CORP. L. 729 (1994) [hereinafter Bayne, Son of
Chiarella]; Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2.
8. Bayne, Essence, supra note 7.
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the law of Insider Trading.
Essence set an ambitious goal and was meant to be the funda-
ment for the solution of all the problems besetting Insider Trading
law. Succeeding articles built on this fundament. First came the
elimination of the baneful "disclose or abstain" rule.9 Next, came
the refutation of the resort in Chiarella to "fiduciary relation."'
Then came the answer to; the queries of Dirks concerning the
"insider," the "tipper," and the "tippee." 11 I
The fifth, however, Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Thee
ory' 2 comes closest in relevance to Bryan and could even claim the
present work as its supplement. "This fifth Article face[d] a triple
challenge: (1) To eradicate the ill effects of the Misappropriation
Theory; (2) To present the state of the law at the end of the cen-
tury by a dissection of that prototype of the present-Chestman; and
(3) To add in the process another substantive segment to the ulti-
mate product of these studies, an all-encompassing Philosophy of
the Insider's Duty."'3
As a supplement to the fifth article, the present endeavor is
meant perforce to give the coup de grace to the Misappropriation
Theory. Whereas Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory'
and the preceding articles gave the philosophical, and broadly le-
gal, arguments for the rejection of the Theory, this analysis of the
Fourth Circuit Bryan case emphasizes the Theory's ad hoc statu-
tory invalidity.
Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory,' in its presenta-
tion of the law's current status, sketched as background a pano-
ramic history of Insider Trading law: (1) the common law antece-
dents, 1909-1961, (2) the advent of section 10(b) and Cady,
Roberts,14 1961, (3) the stable federal period, 1961-1984, and (4)
the collapse of right reason, the advent of the Theory, The Age of
Enlightenment, 1984-1994."
Hence, the present title is: The Awakening, 1995. Not only
does The Awakening, 1995 bring the history up to the moment, but
it views Bryan as a watershed and the beginning of a new era, a re-
9. The "disclose or abstain" rule first appeared in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); see Bayne, Disclose or Abstain?, supra note 7.
10. See Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy, supra note 7.
11. See Bayne, Son of Chiarella, supra note 7.
12. See Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2.
13. Id. at 82.
14. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
15. See Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 88-142.
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turn to sanity and the long-successful, traditional years of Cady,
Roberts, the Second Circuit standouts, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.6 and Chiarella v. United States,17 and the District of Columbia
Circuit's Dirks v. SEC.'s
These various objectives will be pursued in four parts: Part II
is entitled "Butch" Bryan; Part III is called The Repudiation of the
Misappropriation Theory; Part IV will discuss the conflict among
the circuits, and Part V, The Blueprint for the Future, will set the
scene and offer thoughts to the courts, the bar, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
II. "BUTCH" BRYAN
Elton E. "Butch" Bryan, director of the West Virginia lottery,
with the connivance of the lottery's counsel, William Edward Re-
Brook III, and the knowing silence of his patron, Governor Gaston
Caperton, devised a personally rewarding-albeit deceitful-two-
step approach to the impending implementation of the new state
lottery. The first step: "Governor Caperton. . . ultimately de-
cided that [Video Lottery Consultants] VLC would be granted a
'single source' contract, under which VLC would be the exclusive
supplier of video lottery gaming terminals in West Virginia."' 9
Step two: Before informing the investing public of the sup-
plier award-but after lengthy manipulation of the legal proc-20
esses to assure the success of his personal plan-Butch Bryan
"purchased 300 shares of VLC stock. Bryan made all these trades
on the basis of nonpublic, confidential information entrusted to
him in his capacity as Lottery Director.",
2'
And ReBrook conformably proceeded to use "all his available
funds to purchase 100 shares of VLC stock . . . [and] passed on
the information he learned about the financial health of VLC to
two friends who then purchased an additional 6,000 shares.
2
In summary, Butch Bryan, lottery director, (1) used nonpublic
information, knowledge of the valuable contract with VLC, and
(2) purchased VLC stock, (3) without disclosing its enhanced
16. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
19. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1995).
20. See id. at 937-39.
21. Id at 939.
22. United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 964 (4th Cir. 1995).
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value, (4) with considerable loss to VLC sellers.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to section
21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193423 "transmit[ted]" these
facts "to the Attorney General, who. . . institute[d] the necessary
criminal proceedings" for "a violation of any provision of this
chapter. The proceedings were brought under section 32 of the
Act.2
The result: In September 1993 a jury in Charleston found
Butch Bryan guilty of Insider Trading in violation of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.26 The
guilty verdict also included counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and
perjury.
27
On appeal a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed
but with a notable exception: The Insider Trading conviction was
reversedf Circuit Judge J. Michael Luttig's excellent opinion was
joined by two district judges sitting by designation.
Mr. ReBrook later met the same fate in a companion opinion
by another Fourth Circuit panel.29 Circuit Judge Karen J. Williams
wrote that opinion, supported by Judge Luttig and Senior District
Judge John MacKenzie.
In August 1995 a motion for a rehearing en banc was denied.
"Despite the strong urging of the United States Attorney, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to rehear in banc a
Fourth Circuit panel decision reversing a securities fraud convic-
tion [in Bryan] based on the panel's view that the misappropriation
theory is never valid.",3' The reversal of the section 10(b) violation
is the sole present concern.
A. An Elemental Insider Trade
Butch Bryan had stolen a page from Vinnie Chiarella's play-
book. Here was the most pedestrian possible stock scam. In an
anonymous trade, Butch-and Vinnie before him-with secret
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1994).
24. Id. § 78u(d)(1).
25. See id. § 78ff.
26. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 936.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See ReBrook, 58 F.3d at 963.
30. See Full Fourth Circuit Will Not Hear Misappropriation Case, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) at 3-4 (Aug. 30,1995).
31. Id. at 3.
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knowledge that the stock was worth more than was publicly
known, deceived the innocent owners into selling before the news
of the true value broke. The victims were the public investors in
the stock sale.
In Vinnie's case, the infamous Chiarella v. United States, 2 the
facts were parallel. Vinnie had advance, nonpublic, confidential
information and cheated sellers out of $30,000.
Of all the variants of Insider Trading, this is the most unclut-
tered and simple: an anonymous trader buying from another
anonymous trader on a faceless exchange. This paradigm-a "2 +
2" illustration of the ninety years of Insider Trading precedents-is
the ideal vehicle for the Fourth Circuit's brash attack on "our sis-
ter circuits," 3  especially the august Second Circuit.
III. THE REPUDIATION OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The full deftness of Judge Luttig's approach to the special
challenge of Bryan does not sink in with one or two readings. A
careful review is necessary.
At the outset the judge drew a confining perimeter around his
holding and never once put a foot outside the narrow boundaries.
A. The First Exclusion: Liability Under Traditional Section 10(b)
Throughout, the government had not relied on the standard
approach to a section 10(b) case. No alternative argument under
established and tenable precedents was ever proffered. Rather,
"[t]he government proceeded against Bryan under the so-called
'misappropriation theory' of securities fraud liability, a theory that,
although novel to this circuit, has been embraced by the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits."'
So Judge Luttig went along. He chose to confine himself to
the pleadings and not force a section 10(b) holding under the tra-
ditional, tried-and-true doctrine of SEC v. Cady, Roberts35 -which
would be a Chiarella reprise-and thereby establish Bryan's crimi-
nal liability. He thus was blocked from using Bryan as a rejection
of Chiarella and a direct endorsement of the "classical" Insider
32. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
33. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 943 (citing United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981)); see
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); SEC v. Cherif, 933
F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
35. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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Trading law that had been so successful for the quarter century
from 1961-1984.
Sadly, too, the collateral effect of this left the absent inno-
cents, Butch's sellers, unnoticed and unrequited. Their injury
should have been readily remedied but that would have required
action under the traditional section 10(b). Their regrettable fate
should be recalled on another day.
Thus restricted by the government reliance on the novel Mis-
appropriation Theory-only fourteen years old and with a
"somewhat harrowing evolution"' 36-Judge Luttig determined to
make a frontal attack on the Theory's intrinsic validity as inconso-
nant with section 10(b).
This approach, however, was eminently suited to the worthy
task he was patently dying to embrace: the long-overdue repudia-
tion of the bizarre doctrine of the Misappropriation Theory-a
"major error affecting the law of Insider Trading."3 7
And besides, such a frontal attack on validity would set the
scene even more dramatically for a conflict among the circuits than
would a mere return, in an ad hoe adjudication, to the classical
Cady, Roberts tradition.
B. The Second Exclusion: Liability Under the Theory
Note, however, that the judge did not pretend to deny that the
condemned Misappropriation Theory-were he to apply it- would
hold Butch Bryan guilty. However, so great was his disdain for the
Theory that he refused to indulge in such a hypothetical adjudica-
tion. Instead he brushed the matter aside with a cursory recogni-
tion: "Bryan's conduct clearly constituted criminal activity under
this theory of misappropriation."" But nonetheless, he reasoned
that to apply an invalid theory would be an unjustified digression
and only prolong the life of a doctrine destructive of the law of In-
sider Trading. "The question for us . . . is not whether Bryan's
conduct violated section 10(b) under this particular misappropri-
ation theory."39
Rather, the Fourth Circuit addressed this circumscribed query:
"[W]hether criminal liability under section 10(b) . . . can be
36. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953.
37. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 81.
38. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added).
39. Id (emphasis added).
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predicated upon such a theory."4 The answer of course is the
principal burden of its opinion.
In short, the court was not applying section 10(b) at all, either
(1) under the traditional doctrine of Cady, Roberts, or (2) pursuant
to the Theory's contortion of section 10(b). The attack simply said
that the Theory is invalid. It is not section 10(b) at all.
With the perimeter of the holding so narrowly drawn, the
court moved on to an orderly two-phase approach to the question:
Does the Misappropriation Theory meet the mandates of section
10(b)? The first phase:
1. The controlling elements of section 10(b)
Courts have long acknowledged section 10(b) as the lineal de-
scendant of common law deceit.4' More specifically the Insider
Trading law of section 10(b) found its common law origins in
Strong v. Repide42 and Hotchkiss v. Fischer.4
Thus, in a criminal proceeding the court would look first for
the basic requisites of traditional deceit: a misstatement of a ma-
terial fact, made knowingly, to induce reliance, resulting in conse-
quent reliance,44 in addition to the section 10(b) requirement that
the deceit be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity.5
Standing back from these seven fundamentals, the Fourth Cir-
cuit tightened further its limiting perimeter: "Section 10(b), inso-
far as concerns us. . .prohibits only [1] The use of deception, in
the form of material misrepresentations or omissions, [2] to induce
action or inaction by purchasers or sellers of securities, or [3] that
affects others with a vested interest in a securities transaction.
' 46
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984); Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 96;
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY REGULATION 750-59
(3d ed. 1995).
42. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). For the overview of these origins, see Bayne, Misap-
propriation Theory, supra note 2, at 89 (entitled "The Progenitors of Cady, Roberts,
1909-1961").
43. 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-552C (1997) (describing mis-
representation, materiality, scienter, the inducement of reliance, consequent reli-
ance, and damages); Loss, supra note 41, at 750-59.
45. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)
(emphasis added).
46. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added).
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The key words are "insofar as concerns us."
Concisely, section 10(b) prohibits the deception of an investor
in a securities trade. This is the core of section 10(b) that will gov-
ern the holding.
2. The particular theory under indictment
Continuing his methodical approach, Judge Luttig defines the
"particular theory of misappropriation adopted by our sister cir-
cuits. 47 He uses the Ninth Circuit SEC v. Clark:48
Those courts that have adopted the misappropriation the-
ory with which we are concerned in this case have read section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to authorize the criminal conviction of a
person who "(1) misappropriates material nonpublic informa-
tion (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of
trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securi-
ties transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties
to the shareholders of the traded stock.,
49
With that the court has laid out both section 10(b) "insofar as con-
cerns us" and the essence of the Misappropriation Theory of "our
sister circuits."
This gets closer to the decisive question: How does the The-
ory conform to the section 10(b) requisites? If the Theory is to be
an alternative approach to liability, it must have validity under
section 10(b). Lest the reader have any doubt, the answer follows
immediately: "We conclude that. . . section 10(b). . . will [not]
support... the particular theory of misappropriation adopted by
our sister circuits."5
After chastising the "sister circuits" for their unjustified, ex-
pansionist interpretations of section 10(b), Judge Luttig laid out an
underlying principle of his opinion: "For at least two decades...
the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against expanding the
concept of fraud in the securities context beyond what the words of
the Act reasonably will bear.""1  This norm was to be an iron
guideline of his holding: "It is with this simple, but .oft-forgotten,
47. Id.
48. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). For this and other Theory cases, see Bayne,
Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 135-42 (entitled "The Age of Enlighten-
ment: 1984-1994").
49. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added)).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 945 (emphasis added).
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admonition in mind that we adjudge the validity of the misappro-
priation theory."' 2
In a word, the Bryan opinion was to follow religiously (1) the
exact "language of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5," and (2 "the Su-
preme Court authority interpreting these provisions. With the
narrowing of the orbit and the preparatory admonitions behind it,
the Fourth Circuit was at last prepared to challenge the validity of
each element of the Theory, one by one.
But unfortunately, all of Judge Luttig's undeniable orderliness
did not move too felicitously from mind to manuscript. Rather the
judge fired out a mass of arguments much as they surfaced in his
mind. But the arguments were all there. To rearrange the judge's
thoughts, consider this chart as a useful outline of the progress of
the opinion:
C. The Four Antitheses
The Section 10(b) Essentials - The Theory Essentials
52. Id.

















With this chart ready in mind, the Fourth Circuit assaulted the
Misappropriation Theory in every one of the four Antitheses: first,
The Gravamina: Deception and Theft; second, Simple Duty versus
Fiduciary Duty; third, Duty to Whom: Theft Victim or Investor?;
and fourth, Securities Trade or Theft?
The estimable Judge Winter in his dissent to the latest com-
mentary on the Theory, Chestman, aptly expressed the Fourth Cir-
cuit's position. Judge Luttig quotes Judge Winter: "Judge Winter
. . . candidly admitted that 'any obvious relationship [between the
Misapjpropriation Theory and] Section 10(b) is presently miss-
ing. How, conceivably, could the astute Second Circuit have
looked at section 10(b) and seen even a glimmer of the Theory?
The relationship Judge Winter found missing will indeed be
missing in every one of the four Antitheses. But in further prepa-
ration, recall: In summary, 'Butch' Bryan, Lottery Director, (1)
used nonpublic information-knowledge of the valuable contract
with VLC-and (2) purchased VLC stock, (3) without disclosing
its enhanced value, (4) with considerable loss to VLC sellers.
1. The first Antithesis: The Gravamina: Deception and Theft
Among the many imponderables bedeviling the Theory, per-
haps the most inexplicable is the total disparity between the es-
54. Id. at 959 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,578 (2d Cir. 1991) (alteration in original)).
The Victim: The
Deceived Investor
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sence of the "deception" of section 10(b) and that of the "theft" of
the Theory. The Fourth Circuit emphasized this disparity by jux-
taposing the one against the other.
a. the "deception" of section 10(b)
From its common law beginnings in Strong v. Repide55 and
Hotchkiss v. Fischer56 in the century's first quarter, on to the SEC's
Cady, Roberts and the notable Second Circuit opinions Texas
Gulf,58 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,59 Chiarella,6 only one principle
guided the doctrine: the deception of the investor by the insider in
a securities trade. At the core of the tort has always been deceit,
the failure to disclose the true value of the traded stock.
This was the logical result of an expectable interpretation of
the forthright words of the code and the rule. As Judge Luttig
characterized them:
The language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 sweeps
broadly. The statute prohibits the use of "any" manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of "any" security. Similarly,
Rule 10b-5 . . . criminalizes "any" act, practice, or
course of business that operates as a "fraud or deceit"
~ ,, 61upon "any" person.
Inasmuch as section 10(b) is only the codification of common law
deceit, the history of section 10(b) and insider trading has been, in
effect, a study of that common law. 2
Correspondingly, of the relevant elements of deceit-the mis-
statement of a material fact, made knowingly, "in connection
with" a securities trade-every single one speaks to deception. In
the broadest sense deception permeates the traditional section
10(b). Judge Luttig understood this. Hence his governing pro-
nouncement: "Manipulation and deception are the touchstones of
section 10(b) liability.' 63
55. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
56. 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
57. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
58. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
60. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
61. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added).
62. See Loss, supra note 41, at 750-52.
63. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945.
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A touchstone is a criterion for determining the quality or
genuineness of a thing. 4 The court was saying that the product is
not genuine without deception. In support of this thesis, the judge
went immediately to the 1977 Supreme Court and the one case-
the oft-cited Santa Fe Industries v. Green6 -- that should have de-
terred the "sister circuits" at their very first foray into the Theory:
"'The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or decep-
tion.,,,66
The court expectably followed up this first reliance on Santa
Fe Industries-many more follow throughout the opinion-by a
second resort to the "language of § 10(b)." "Section 10(b) thus
makes it 'unlawful for any person. . .[t]o use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance,' in contravention of SEC
rules."67
1) the sole touchstone
Judge Luttig's style, and particularly his unstructured presen-
tation, belie his sound grasp of the genius of the "classical" section
10(b). But clearly he had studied both the history of Insider
Trading as well as the aberrations of the Theory.
For purposes of assessing the validity [read: genuineness]
of the misappropriation theory, we need focus solely on
the scope of the statutory phrase "deception" "in connec-
tion with" a securities transaction and the Rule 10b-5
phrase "fraud" "in connection with" a securities transac-
tion, because "manipulation" is "virtually a term of art"
in the securities context.6
What the judge meant was that "manipulation" as used in section
10(b) was merely descriptive of, or a subset of, the inclusive de-
ception.
The judge then set up the Antithesis, and the perfect segue to
the antipolar theft: "Our specific concern is whether the Rule's
64. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1247 (1988).
65. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
66. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473
(1977) (emphasis added).
67. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1995)).
68. ld. (emphasis added) (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476, and quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
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prohibition of 'fraud' [as synonymous with deception]. . . may ex-
tend to breaches of fiduciary duty involving the misappropriation
of confidential information.""
b. the "theft" of the theory
[Tiheft rather than fraud or deceit, seems the gravamen
of the [misappropriation] prohibition.
-Judge Ralph K. Winter, United States v. Chestman. °
Since overall "'any obvious relationship [with] Section 10(b) is
presently missing,"' 7' and since "'theft'. .. has [niever been inte-
gral to . . . Section 10(b), 7 2 "[o]ne wonders how theft ever in-
serted itself into the longtime deceit action of Section 10(b)." 73
How could a concept so foreign, so alien to deception, sud-
denly supplant the time-honored heart of section 10(b)? How can
someone equate theft with deception? The answer can be found in
an overview of Insider Trading law in the 1980s. In a nutshell, the
state of the law was chaos and a fertile field for any aberrant wan-
derings.
Misconceptions and misunderstandings about the classical
doctrine of Insider Trading-notably the definition of Insider,74 the
disclose or abstain rule,75 and the necessity of fiduciary duty76-
had increasingly confused the courts. Minor aberrations had be-
come major, and soon the law was in such a mess that general
complaint became widespread. "[W]ipe the slate clean and start
over."77 "The uncertainties engulfing the law of insider trading
have provoked vociferous 
demands.
' 7 t
In this mess the courts, in desperation, stumbled onto the
69. Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 949 n.14 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551,578 (2d Cir. 1991)).
71. IL at 959 (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
72. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 147 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 144.
74. See Bayne, Son of Chiarella, supra note 7.
75. See Bayne, Disclose or Abstain?, supra note 7.
76. See Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy, supra note 7.
77. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 79 (quoting Professor
David L. Ratner).




Theory in United States v. Newman:79 "The Second Circuit first
adopted the misappropriation theory in United States v. Newman.
. . .[and] concluded easily that the misappropriation of informa-
tion constitutes 'fraud' under Rule AMb-5."' Newman's "easy con-
clusion" was based on the totally collateral and casual remark of
Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in the pitiful Chiarella. Luttig
quotes Burger: "Because the defendants 'misappropriated-stole
to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to
[them] in the utmost confidence,'. . . they had. . . 'defrauded
those employers as surely as if they took their money.'' s.
But the Fourth Circuit did not want any misunderstanding
about Chief Justice Burger's true position on the Theory. The
court conceded that the Chief Justice did actually advert to the
theft of information. "However, he specifically identified the
predicate fraud. . . as nondisclosure, and not the misappropriation
of the information itself.
8 2
Justice Burger was simply saying that the source of the non-
public information-by theft-was irrelevant. What counted was
the nondisclosure of that information once "stolen." The grava-
men of the tort was not the stealing, but the deception in later not
disclosing the true value of stock traded. Judge Luttig clarified
further: "For the Chief Justice, therefore, the misappropriation of
information gives rise to a duty, the breach of which, through
trading without disclosure, constitutes fraud under the Rule."83
Justice Burger was not modifying the long-standing "deceit" req-
uisite of the tort but merely explaining its operation.
Thus the Chief Justice would readily acknowledge that Butch
Bryan could loosely be said to have "misappropriated-stole to put
it bluntly"' -from the lottery the confidential news of VLC's en-
hanced value. But that only meant that Butch thereby was bur-
dened with a duty, the breach of which, through trading without
disclosure to his innocent sellers of VLC shares, "constitutes fraud
under the Rule.8'
79. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
80. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 954.
81. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 245
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).
82. Id. at 954 n.18 (emphasis added).
83. Id
84. See id. at 954 (emphasis added) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)).
85. Id. at 954 n.18 (emphasis added).
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So in the end the Chief Justice's collateral remark did not im-
pugn the classical section 10(b) at all. Chiarella-whence the obi-
ter remark-was 100% a traditional deceit action. "The Supreme
Court bypassed the... 'misappropriation theory' [in the appeal inChiarella].'
Furthermore the irrationality of Chiarella had nothing to do
with the Theory. Rather the classical deceit was unfortunately and
inexplicably misapplied, which, again, had nil to do with theft or
the Theory. The connection was simply concocted by Newman.
1) "mere theft"
The Bryan court seemed to take it for granted that all would
realize that the essence of theft had little in common with that of
deception. Theft is the taking of something of value from another
without force but without consent. In no way need the victim be
deceived. Whether he is deceived in the taking process, no matter.
The involuntary taking is the heart of the theft.
To the contrary, deception entails no taking at all but denotes
merely an act whereby one induces another "to accept as true or
valid what is untrue or invalid"' without regard to objects of value
or their involuntary acquisition.
True, "theft" and "deceit" might conceivably be third cousins
one to another, but certainly no one would consider "theft" to
be at the heart of Section 10(b). Onetime SEC General
Counsel Ralph C. Ferrara undoubtedly felt this way: "When
you have to justify common sense rules in the mold of mis-
appropriation, you get into twisted arcane analysis.""
Judge Luttig, therefore, simply set out to show beyond a doubt
that the Misappropriation Theory really did require theft as a
prime requisite of the tort of Insider Trading and concluded gratui-
tously that theft thereby met the section 10(b) mandate for decep-
tion.
Since few could believe that the Theory was in fact substitut-
ing theft for deception, the court quoted instance after instance
from Theory opinions. First from the prototypal Second Circuit
Chestman: "Under this misappropriation theory, the 'fraud' re-
86. Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy, supra note 7, at 702.
87. WEBSTER'S, supra note 64, at 329.
88. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 144 (quoting Sherry R.
Sontag, Insider Trading Limited: SEC Tries to Halt Erosion of Rule, NAT'L L. J.,
Nov. 2, 1992, at 3 (quoting Ralph C. Ferrara, SEC General Counsel, 1978-1981)).
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quirement of Rule 10b-5 is deemed to be satisfied when a person
'misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach of a fi-
duciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence."' ' 9
Then from Newman: "Because the [Newman] court held that Rule
10b-5's predicate fraud requirement was established through the
mere theft of the confidential information, it undertook no inquiry
into whether there was the statutorily required deception."" Re-
call that the Second Circuit first concocted the Theory in New-
man.
91
None of the three major Theory cases-Clark,92 Cherif,93 or
Chestman94-made any studied attempt to analyze the essence of
the deception of section 10(b) and then compare it with the well-
known understanding of the Theory's substitute, theft. Even a
casual reader would never equate theft with deceit. A philosophi-
cal dissection of each, moreover, would certainly highlight their
disparity.
2) the deus ex machina: fiduciary duty
The theorists then proceeded to roil the waters further by in-
truding the equally foreign concept of fiduciary duty into that of
theft. It was not enough that theft supplanted deception. Now the
theft had to be perpetrated by a trusted fiduciary! Eventually the
canonized definition of the Theory joined the theft-seemingly in-
extricably, certainly inexplicably-with a "breach of fiduciary
duty." Liability then resulted only when a person "(1) misappro-
priates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty...
89. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 954 (emphasis added) (discussing United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981); see also id. at 954 n.19 (commenting on the difficulty of determin-
ing the precise basis upon which the conviction was affirmed).
91. The initial application of the Theory flowed from the pen of Judge Van
Graafeiland of the Second Circuit, who grafted Chief Justice Burger's dissenting re-
mark in Chiarella onto the facts of his own Newman opinion, thus: "In [Chiarella],
Chief Justice Burger, in dissenting, said that the defendant 'misappropriated-stole
to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence."' Newman, 664 F.2d at 17 (emphasis added). And: "[S]ince
[Newman's] sole purpose in participating in the misappropriation of confidential
takeover information was to purchase shares . . . ,we find little merit in his disa-
vowal of a connection between the fraud and the purchase." Id. at 18 (emphasis
added).
92. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
93. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
94. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
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of trust.'95
One could reliably infer that the theorists were intimating that
by the injection of the close bond of fiduciary duty between the
thief and his trusting victim in Bryan, the mere act of stealing
would smack more of deceiving than the unadorned act of mere
theft.
The fact remains that theft, even from a trusting victim, has no
intrinsic denotation-or even connotation-of the deceit of the
victim, whether trusting or untrusting or even distrusting. Theft is
still theft and says nil in its definition about deceiving or tricking or
conning the victim.
In any event, the theorists got hung up on the justification of
the admixture of fiduciary duty into the essence of the theft in the
definition of the Theory. Consider a rare illustration:
3) the Clark rationale
One Theory opinion-the Ninth Circuit Clark-did make a
totally failed attempt at reconciling theft with deceit. In the proc-
ess Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall adequately proved-exactly at
odds with her purpose-that "'any obvious relationship [with] Sec-
tion 10(b) is presently missing."" Luttig quotes Hall:
"[B]y becoming part of a fiduciary or similar relationship,
an individual is implicitly stating that she will not divulge
or use to her own advantage information entrusted to her
in the utmost confidence. She deceives the other party by
playing the role of the trustworthy employee or agent; she
defrauds it by actually using the stolen information to its
detriment."'
But the more the theorists proceeded down the path of
blending fiduciary duty with the theft component, the more they
realized that strict logic led them to the conclusion that the Theory
would have to apply-as Cherif had opined-"even to 'mere'
thieves,""8 who surely had no personal bond of any kind to the vic-
tim, let alone fiduciary.
Judge Luttig had the insight to pursue this path, undoubtedly
sensing that it led to the realization that the Theory was diametri-
95. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added) (citing Clark, 915 F.2d at 433).
96. Id. at 959 (emphasis added) (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
97. Id. at 949 n.13 (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 448).
98. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412 n.6.
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cally opposed to the 10(b) requisite of deception:
Moreover, while the courts adopting the misappropriation
theory incant that the breach of a fiduciary relationship is
a necessary element of the offense, in principle, if not in
reality, these courts would be obliged to find liability in
the case of simple theft by an employee, even where no fi-
duciary duty has been breached, for the raison d'etre of
the misappropriation theory in fact is concern over "the
unfairness inherent in trading on [stolen] information."' "
This wrangling over the roles of fiduciary duty and theft-as ir-
relevant as it is in equating theft with deception-does lead admi-
rably into Judge Luttig's second area of attack on the Theory.
2. The second Antithesis: Simple Duty versus Fiduciary Duty
The first great anomaly intrinsic to the Theory was the sudden
emergence of theft as a surrogate for the deceit of the traditional
section 10(b). This first of the four Antithesis was thoroughly ex-
posed by Judge Luttig at the outset of his opinion. The upshot saw
two clear-cut conclusions: the essence of the violation of section
10(b) has always been deception 0 while theft, to the contrary, has
never constituted a violation of section 10(b).'0 '
On to these conclusions, Judge Luttig founded his attack on
the second major aberration that was injected-as incongruously
as had been the first-into the tenets of the Theory.
The Bryan opinion analyzed the second Antithesis in five de-
veloping stages: (1) the duty defined, (2) the genesis of a fiduciary
duty, (3) the definition of the Insider, (4) fiduciary duty explicitly
rejected, and (5) the Antithesis reconciled.
Since Judge Luttig continued his disdain for a structured out-
line, these guideposts will point the way. The judge does, however,
again supply all the substantive argumentation.
a. the duty defined
Bryan found it effortless to move from the violation of section
10(b) to the duty that the violation violated. If the offense is non-
disclosure, the duty necessarily must be: to disclose, to tell the
99. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951 (emphasis added) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
100. See icL at 944.
101. See id. at 954.
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truth. From the malefaction nondisclosure, the illation to the
simple duty of disclosure can readily be made.
Judge Luttig fortified this line of reasoning by immediate re-
sort to the Supreme Court, beginning again with Santa Fe Indus-
tries, which led off with the positive affirmation of the duty as one
of disclosure, without more.
In Santa Fe Industries, the Supreme Court defined the de-
ception proscribed in section 10(b) as. . . the nondisclo-
sure of material information in violation of a duty to dis-
close. In so defining the term, the Court squarely rejected
the Second Circuit's interpretation of section 10(b) that
"neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure [is] a neces-
sary element of a Rule 10b-5 action." 102
Since Santa Fe Industries was decided in 1977, Judge Luttig
brought the Supreme Court up to 1994 with Central Bank of Den-
ver. The court continued with the positive approach, affirming the
duty as one of disclosure. In Judge Luttig's words:
Only last Term, the Court reaffirmed that the term
"deception" in section 10(b) references only the misrep-
resentation or omission of a material fact: As in earlier
cases considering conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we again
conclude that the statute prohibits only the making of a
material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of
a manipulative act."'
A somewhat obiter reflection: Both the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court include the important word "material" in the sec-
tion 10(b) proscription. The deception must be material.
Judge Luttig used this subsidiary requirement of the code as
further evidence of the disconsonance of the Theory:
The misappropriation theory likewise does not attempt to
give meaning to the materiality requirement of section
10(b), nor could it. The only relevant misrepresentation
or nondisclosure under the misappropriation theory, as-
suming such is present, is that to the source of the infor-
mation. Because the source generally is not connected to
or interested in the securities transaction, it would be
meaningless to ask whether that misrepresentation af-
102. Id at 946 (emphasis added) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
470 (1977)).
103. Id (emphasis added).
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fected the source's investment decision." 4
Note well that the Supreme Court, in both Santa Fe Industries
and Central Bank of Denver,°5 enunciated a simple order: a duty
to disclose. The command had no special qualifier. As Judge Lut-
tig noted: "Section 10(b) thus makes it 'unlawful for any person,.
. [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance,' in contravention of SEC rules,"' not merely a trustee, or a
fiduciary, or a confidant.
Since section 10(b) so clearly mandated a simple duty to dis-
close, the question is irresistible: Whence the Theory's highly cir-
cumscribed fiduciary duty not to steal? Since Bryan has already
eliminated the theft ingredient, the only remaining chore is to ex-
plain the origin of the "fiduciary."
b. the genesis of a "fiduciary" duty
One would expectably ask why a thief who stole inside infor-
mation from an employer must now be a fiduciary as well as an
employee? If theft is truly the gravamen of the section 10(b) vio-
lation, why must the thief also be a trustee? Why is trust needed to
render a "mere theft" a crime?
The answer to these understandable queries is essentially his-
torical. The first appearance of the erroneous fiduciary requisite
in a section 10(b) action actually antedated the appearance of the
Theory itself, but only by one year.' A fiduciary duty had cer-
tainly not been an established element of classical section 10(b).
Fiduciary duty was in fact an accretion that first appeared in
Chiarella08-- and was perpetuated in Dirks' 9 three years later-
and resulted from the Supreme Court's inability to rationalize an
irrational holding. Remember that Judge Winter of the Second
Circuit had said, "The Chiarella opinion is thus an enigma."
110
104. Id. at 949 n.16 (emphasis added).
105. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
106. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1995)).
107. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (premising liability
"upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction"); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (1981)
(premising liability on the misappropriation of confidential takeover information).
108. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
109. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
110. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 575 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., con-
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The scene was this: The Court's timorous majority had de-
termined a priori on a denial of recovery to a defrauded public.
The holding was patently untenable-indeed it has elicited years
of adverse criticism"'-and the Court had no logical way to extri-
cate itself from this dead end.
12
In any event, the hapless Justice Powell found his way out of
the predicament-or so he had hoped-by tampering with a fun-
dament of the law of Insider Trading, by altering the basic defini-
tion of the Insider.
c. the definition of the Insider
The Chiarella majority had readily agreed that the section
10(b) duty was a duty of disclosure. No thought had ever arisen
that section 10(b) prohibited theft. This was undisputed.
However, in spite of this good beginning, Chiarella forthwith
lost its way. When the Court asked, "Who has this Duty to dis-
close?" it stumbled. It knew that it was the Insider who had the
duty to disclose. But who was an Insider?
From the earliest realization that Insider Trading was an ac-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Commentary on Chiarella abounds. In addition to the author's own readju-
dication of the Chiarella facts, see Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy, supra note 7, at 720-27.
The following articles are representative commentary on the Court's reasoning: Al-
lison G. Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341
(1982); John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 1307 (1981); Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court
Approach to SEC Rule lOb-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981); Mi-
chael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1
(1980); Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common
Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 845 (1982); Harry Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3
and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517 (1982); Peter J.
Henning, Between Chiarella and Congress: A Guide to the Private Cause of Action
for Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 39 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982); Richard J. Morgan, The'Insider Trading Rules
After Chiarella: Are They Consistent with Statutory Policy?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1407
(1982); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980); William K. S. Wang, Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can
Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981); C. Larimore Whi-
taker & James E. Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counterrevolution in Securities
Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979); Roman P. Wuller, Insider Trading: Circum-
venting the Restrictive Contours of the Chiarella and Dirks Decisions, 1985 ILL. L.
REV. 503 (1985).




tionable tort, the American courts had faced the question: "Who is
an Insider?" From the 1930s on, the assumption had been univer-
sal that "any person"-which was the simple wording of section
10(b) 113-who traded in a stock had a "duty of fair representa-
tion,' 14 as Judge Luttig put it.
But then the bleeding hearts on the Chiarella Court began to
fear that too many traders would be held liable, that too broad a
net would be cast. That would be, in that popular pejorative word,
"draconian." ' So the Chiarella majority began to thrash about
through several pages of ambivalence and finally narrowed the
definition of Insider to include fewer and fewer persons. The step-
by-step evolution of this struggle was detailed at length in Chi-
arella and the 'Fiduciary' Fallacy.
11 6
Finally, the Chiarella Justices decided that, since Vinnie was
not the seller's fiduciary, he had no duty to tell them the truth
about the value of their stock. The Court observed in Chiarella
that the duty to disclose. . . only "aris[es] from a relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties.
Even the most bleeding of hearts had to admit that a trustee
should not lie to his beneficiary, or an attorney to his client, or a
father to his son. On this, even the most timorous Justice could be
bold.
Judge Luttig backed up this Chiarella position by also adduc-
ing Dirks. Dirks "reaffirm[ed] . . . that '[a] duty [to disclose]
arises from the relationship between parties."'1 ' Aliis verbis,
Vinnie would have a duty not to lie to his son Vincent in a similar
deal. But such liability would extend to few others.
Understand, however, that Chiarella had not a smidgen of the
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1995). "Section 10(b) ... makes it 'unlawful for any
person. . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,' in contravention of
[SECI rules." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945.
114. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 n.9.
115. "[W]e have focused on [the defendant's] liability at the outset in order to il-
lustrate the 'Draconian liability'. . . under the district court's interpretation ....
Because we conclude that. . . imposition of civil liability constitutes an unwarranted
extension of the judicially created private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, we re-
verse." Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)
(citing Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,242 (2d Cir. 1974)).
116. Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy, supra note 7, at 691-93.
117. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230).
118. Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983), in turn quoting Chi-
arella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.14).
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Misappropriation Theory about it. Rather, Chiarella was pure and
simple old-line section 10(b)-old-line section 10(b), that is, gone
totally astray.
The fiduciary duty of Chiarella differs in another, even more
noteworthy, way from the version in the Theory. In Chiarella the
fiduciary duty was owed to the victim of nondisclosure, the victim
with whom the Insider traded. This, at least, has some logic to it.
On the other hand, the fiduciary duty that later appeared in
the Theory was owed, remarkably, not to a deceived trader but to
a victim of theft who had no connection at all with a securities
trade. That was doubly illogical: why a fiduciary, and why by a
thief?
This peculiar fiduciary errancy of Chiarella found itself bodily
transported into the Theory when it first emerged later in the Sec-
ond Circuit in the 1980s.
1) Luttig and the Insider
Once again the casual reader of Bryan might not advert to the
important treatment accorded to this elemental-and altogether
fundamental-question: Who is an Insider? Judge Luttig did not
draw pictures or ring bells, but he did state his position clearly and
thoroughly. He went to a recent opinion of the Supreme Court,
the 1994 Central Bank of Denver, to enunciate his stand. The
Court was categorical. Here are the relevant words selected by
Judge Luttig: "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, account-
ant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a ma-
terial misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5."'' 0
These words "any person" by Justice Kennedy in 1994 are
redolent of the equally categorical pronouncement of The Com-
pendium of the Insider's Duty, first propounded in Insider Trading:
The Essence of the Insider's Duty in 1992.121
"The Insider may be any person, with or without a fiduciary
relation, inside or outside the corporate counsels, the corporate
contr6leur, a director, an officer, tipper, tippee, eavesdropper or
119. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
120. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 (emphasis added) (quoting Central Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. at 191).
121. Bayne, Essence, supra note 7, at 352-53.
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bystander, who possesses the defined information."'
At another point Judge Luttig resonates Essence:
Chiarella and Dirks arose in the context of alleged non-
disclosure. We presume, though the Court has not so
stated, that a larger pool of investors is subject to the duty
of fair representation. . . in that a party. . . will ordi-
narily be under a duty of fair representation even if he
does not qualify as an insider, quasi-insider, or tippee un-
der Chiarella and.Dirks.lu
In other words, Judge Luttig did not want to limit the "pool of in-
vestors" to the narrower meaning of Chiarella and Dirks. Rather,
Judge Luttig broadened the pool of investors and embraced the
definition of Central Bank of Denver, which covers any person or
entity. By thus extending the definition of an Insider to include
"any person" who trades with another, the Fourth Circuit effec-
tively removed any fiduciary duty requirement from section 10(b).
This point should be stressed: not only is Bryan a ringing de-
nunciation of the entire Misappropriation Theory, but it is a
needed reaffirmation of the all-inclusiveness of the bold words of
section 10(b), "any person," and the equally inclusive "the insider
may be any person" of the compendium of Essence.'2 4
d. fiduciary duty explicitly rejected
As must already have been discerned, Judge Luttig was not
given to euphemisms or circumlocution. Lest he had not already
made his point in his inclusive definition of the Insider, he again
went to the Supreme Court: "Indeed, the Court in Santa Fe Indus-
tries specifically rejected the notion that a breach of fiduciary duty,
in and of itself, is prohibited by section 10(b)."'25 Judge Luttig bol-
stered the Supreme Court's position by noting that Santa Fe Indus-
tries-which in turn quotes an earlier Supreme Court opinion,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder-
reason[ed] that "[t]o the extent" the lower court, in imposing
liability, rel[ied] on the use of the term "fraud" in Rule 10b-5
to bring within the ambit of the Rule all breaches of fiduciary
duty in connection with a securities transaction, its interpreta-
tion would. .. "add a gloss to the operative language of the
122. See id at 331.
123. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 n.9 (emphasis added).
124. Bayne, Essence, supra note 7, at 352-53.
125. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946.
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statute quite different from its commonly accepted mean-
ing. 126  127
Verbum satis sapienti.
e. the Antithesis reconciled
Of course, in truth, no genuine reconciliation is possible. The
marked Antithesis persists between the unqualified duty to dis-
close-avoidance of deception-of section 10(b) and the Theory's
mere breach of a fiduciary duty. Before any conciliatory discus-
sion began, Judge Luttig wanted this clearly understood:
In any event, by its own terms, the misappropriation the-
ory does not even require deception, but rather allows the
imposition of liability upon the mere breach of a fiduciary
relationship or similar relationship of trust and confi-
dence. Such a theory obviously cannot be squared with
the holding of Santa Fe Industries that a breach of fiduci-
ary duty, even in connection with a purchase or sale of se-
curities, does not give rise to liability under section 10(b),
absent deception.
With that made eminently clear, the judge did attempt to discuss a
confined area where deception and fiduciary duty might be con-
ceived to coalesce.
Make certain, Judge Luttig would be the first to find liability
for a breach of fiduciary duty in a securities transaction, but if, and
only if, the true gravamen of the act was deceit, not merely the
breach of fiduciary duty. In short, Bryan would surely hold a fidu-
ciary liable, but the liability would be a fortiori. "Any person"
would be liable for such a lie but a trusted trustee or similar confi-
dant would be more readily so. But to hold liability under section
10(b) only if a fiduciary was unthinkable.
Bryan again went to the Supreme Court to substantiate its
position: "Significantly, the Court also repeated what it character-
ized as the 'holding' of Santa Fe Industries: that section 10(b) does
not 'reach_ breaches of fiduciary duty. . . without any charge of
126. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472
(1977), in turn quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
127. A word to the wise is sufficient. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY
1360 (1979).




misrepresentation or lack of disclosure."'129
To cap off its resort to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit
concluded the point with Dirks:
That these principles established in Santa Fe Industries
and Central Bank of Denver are applicable. . . was con-
firmed by the Court in Dirks: Not "all breaches of fiduci-
ary duty in connection with a securities transaction"..
come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5. There must also be
manipulation or deception. . . . Thus, an insider will be
liable under Rule 10b-5 only where he fails to disclose
material nonpublic information before trading on it [in
violation of a duty to disclose or abstain] and thus makes
secret profits. 130
3. The third Antithesis: Duty to Whom: Theft Victim or
Investor?
In summary, Butch Bryan, lottery director, (1) used nonpublic
information-knowledge of the valuable contract with VLC-and
(2) purchased VLC stock, (3) without disclosing its enhanced value,
(4) with considerable loss to VLC sellers.
The assault on the Theory now moves to the next basic ques-
tion: Who is the victim of this Insider Trading? The Theory says
that Butch's employer, the state lottery, was the victim of the theft
and hence suffered the injury. Judge Luttig argues, in opposition,
that section 10(b) was originally enacted to protect primarily the
investing public, the innocent owners of VLC stock, cheated by
Butch.
In carrying forward his attack, and answering this elementary
query, the judge again employed his successful stratagem of the
artful juxtaposition. First, he laid out the unsupportable tenet of
the Theory, and second, contrasted the contrary position of the
traditional section 10(b).
a. the victim under the Theory
In his expos6 of the First Antithesis, Judge Luttig laid down
the basic premise that undergirds the entire Theory: The heart of
129. Id at 946 (emphasis added) (quoting Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at
174, in turn quoting Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 470).
130. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946 (emphasis added) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654, in
turn quoting Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 470) (brackets in the original).
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the 10(b) malefaction is theft. As in Chestman: "[Tlheft rather
than fraud or deceit, seems the gravamen of the [misappropriation]
prohibition.'
31
Here was the Theory's first fatal misstep. Eliminate deceit
and substitute theft and the straight path of logic leads unswerv-
ingly from one major error to another. Begin with that untenable
premise and untenable conclusions inexorably follow.
In his second expos6, the judge carried the argumentation
forward and concluded logically that if the violation is theft of in-
formation, the duty violated must be: Do not steal information.
Thus did the Theory stray further from the truth.
These two postulates in turn led the Theory, equally logically
and equally untenably, to the fallacy of this third Antithesis. The
reasoning was impeccable: Since the duty is do not steal informa-
tion and the wrong is theft of the information, the victim must be
the person from whom the information was stolen. Since Butch,
the Insider, was the thieving employee of the lottery, the lottery
suffered the Insider Trading damage. The lottery was the victim.
Conscious that few could believe that courts would actually
propound such absurdities or that the Theory would in fact aban-
don the sixty-year tradition of section 10(b), the judge went to the
Seventh Circuit's analysis of Newman in Cherif for corroboration:
"The Court [in Newman] was. . .influenced by the damage in-
flicted on the insider trader's employer by a conniving em-
ployee.'
132
The Second Circuit decision in Moss, as Luttig noted, was "a
case involving an employee's breach of his duty to his employer to
'disclose or abstain' from trading,. . . even though Newman was
explicit that the fraud was the theft of information, and not the
failure to disclose before trading.",
3
The Bryan Court placed considerable blame on the Second
Circuit decision in Newman for this particular anomaly of the third
Antithesis: The Insiders, by stealing information from their em-
ployers, "defrauded those employers as surely as if they took their
money. ' 3 The Lottery was the "defrauded" victim.
131. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 955 (quoting SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir.
1991)).
133. Id. (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)).
134. Id. at 944 (quoting United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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By calling theft fraud and the employer the victim, the Theory
spawned a new legal buzzword. Jurists and commentators-
notably the Second Circuit and the authoritative Louis Loss-
immediately characterized the deceit as fraud on the source. Why?
Because the employer, the lottery, was the "source" whence the
"conniving employee," Butch Bryan, learned of the increased
value of VLC stock. Thus the Second Circuit Chestman refers to
the "misappropriation theory as a 'fraud on the source' theory of
10b-5 liability.'
' 35
1) the victim is not the investor
At this point, section 10(b) suffers further, unexpected vio-
lence. The Theory does not merely add new protection to a hith-
erto nonparty, the source. That was surprise enough. But the
Theory advertently removes the selling innocents from section
10(b) coverage. In short, the employer supplants the deceived
sellers. The source is added, the investor removed.
The Theory is in fact saying not one but two things about the
victim of the deceit: (1) The real victim is the source of the stolen
information, the lottery, and (2) the deceived shareholders who
sold to Butch have no protection under section 10(b). "That is,
[Bryan and ReBrook] did not owe the people with whom they
traded a duty to disclose.'
136
The Bryan court underlined this added excess of the Theory:
"[T]he [insider] owes no duty of disclosure to the purchaser or
seller of the securities."137
The Theory has been thorough in removing any semblance of
duty to Butch's sellers, a severe break with the Second Circuit
past: "In contrast to Chiarella and Dirks the misappropriation
theory does not require that the buyer or seller of securities be de-
frauded."'
Bryan added a gloss to this line of commentary by noting that
the source, the lottery, need not even be a party to any securities
transaction at all but will nonetheless be the victim under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934: "The source of the nonpublic in-
formation need not be a purchaser or seller of securities [or] be af-
135. Id. (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567).
136. Id. at 958.
137. Id at 944.
138. Id. (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566).
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filiated with a purchaser or seller."'39
Pause for a moment to reflect on this latest of the Theory's in-
concinnities. Under the Theory, Butch Bryan finds himself bur-
dened with a duty of loyalty induced by securities law-which has
never been an element of securities law-to his employer the lot-
tery, which was not involved in any securities transaction. But
Butch had no duty of disclosure, under a securities disclosure stat-
ute, to the sellers of securities with whom he actually traded and
whom he actually deceived.
In 1992 Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory"40 pres-
aged the Luttig position to the effect that the "theory does not re-
quire that the buyer or seller of securities be defrauded:""14
To borrow from Cady, Roberts, the Theory "ignores the
plight of the buying public-wholly unprotected from the
misuse of special information." This shift in direction,
from the trading innocents to the party from whom the in-
formation is stolen, changes the entire thrust of the tradi-
tional deceit action to one of theft. Section 10(b) has
been metamorphosed.
4 2
This aptly introduces the second half of Judge Luttig's juxtaposi-
tion.
b. the victim according to section 10(b)
[A] violation [of section 10(b)] may be found only where there
is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors. "' 43
The exasperation that surfaces periodically throughout Judge
Luttig's opinion can readily be excused by considering just one of
the many chores he faced in Bryan: The necessity to point out to
"our sister circuits" that the securities laws were enacted to protect
investors in securities, not theft victims.
Why would the judge have to prove a point that was repeated
per longum et latum in countless federal opinions over a sixty-year
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 87.
141. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 (emphasis added).
142. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 88 (quoting Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961)).




span? As the 1994 opinion of the Supreme Court, Central Bank of
Denver said, the "broad congressional purpose[ ]" of the Act is "to
protect investors from false and misleading practices that might
injure them.""'  The judge added in Santa Fe Industries in 1977:
"[The] purpose of [the] prohibition on manipulation [is] to protect
investors from being misled." 
45
But Judge Luttig, exasperation withal, did go forward assidu-
ously to quote from the leading Supreme Court opinions to
counter the Theory's preposterous position. "The [Supreme]
Court has left no doubt that the principal concern of section 10(b)
is the protection of purchasers and sellers of securities. This was
the very premise of the Court's leading cases in Chiarella and
Dirks, and most recently, Central Bank of Denver."'46 Thus, Santa
Fe Industries, Chiarella, Dirks, and Central Bank of Denver left
little room to include the West Virginia lottery among the pro-
tected victims of the Securities Act of 1934.
After adducing successively (1) Central Bank of Denver in
1994, (2) Santa Fe Industries in 1977, (3) Ernst & Ernst in 1976, and
(4) Dirks in 1983, the Bryan court summed up the Supreme
Court's long tradition in a sweeping statement:
At the same time that the Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that section 10(b) is concerned only with deception
in the form of material misrepresentations and omissions,
it has equally clearly instructed that the section is primar-
ily if not exclusively concerned with the deception of pur-
chasers and sellers of securities.' 47
Over many paragraphs, Bryan analyzed a fifth Supreme Court
opinion, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,"' to the same ef-
fect, and noted as an intensifier: "Three Members of the [Blue
Chip] Court even wrote separately to emphasize that the plain
language of section 10(b) limited any action to purchasers and sell-
ers of securities."' '
Just as rigid logic led the Theory logically from a false prem-
ise-theft is the gravamen-to a false conclusion-the victim is the
144. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 173-74).
145. Id. (emphasis added) (paraphrasing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476-77).
146. Id. at 946-47 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
148. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
149. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 948 (emphasis added) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 760 (Powell, J., concurring)).
January 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
victim of the theft-so too did rigid logic guide section 10(b) to the
opposite position. The gravamen is nondisclosure and the only
victim of deceit is the one deceived, the innocent investors who
sold their stock to Butch.
4. The fourth Antithesis: Securities Trade or Theft?
The last of the Theory's anomalies would not deserve special
attention were it not for the provision inserted by the Congress
when the common law tort of deceit was given specific application
to a modem securities transaction. A practiced tort person would
undoubtedly have seen little reason for gilding a lily that needed
no adornment.
But no matter, the Congress in 1934 so saw fit and in the proc-
ess employed explicit language that focused the ambit of the Act
to a limited sphere. Briefly, liability under section 10(b) would be
present only when deception occurred "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security."'50
Judge Luttig was constrained, therefore, to address the The-
ory's flagrant disregard of these clear-cut words of the code.
Again his opinion juxtaposed the true and the false. This time,
however, the emphasis was first on the unambiguous mandate of
the 1934 Act and then on the failure of the Theory to conform.
a. the stricture of section 10(b)
Early in its opinion the Fourth Circuit flagged the statutory
obstacle confronting the Theory: "The language of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 sweeps broadly. The statute prohibits the use of
'any' manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 'in connec-
tion with' the purchase or sale of 'any' security.
15'
Judge Luttig wanted to stress that he saw no delicate nuances
of meaning in the phrase "in connection with." This was simply a
forthright code proviso. "Section 10(b), it bears repeating, reaches
only deception of persons with some connection to, or some inter-
est or stake in, an actual or proposed purchase or sale of securi-
ties. ,
, 1
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) (emphasis added).
151. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945.
152. Id. at 949-50 (emphasis added).
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1) Blue Chip Stamps, 1975
"We based [our] conclusion [in Blue Chip Stamps] largely on
the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which by their terms gov-
ern only 'the purchase or sale of any security."""
Judge Luttig could arguably be accused of underplaying the
cogency of the Supreme Court's stand in positing for section 10(b)
liability the requirement of a connection between the deception
and an actual securities transaction. In truth, Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores'54 is an a fortiori support for the proposition
"that a person in some way connected to a securities transaction be
deceived."'55
Manor Drug was proffered a binding offer to buy into
Blue Chip on admittedly favorable terms. But Manor
Drug was denied the relevant material nonpublic infor-
mation that would have convinced it to buy. An unin-
formed Manor Drug declined. Manor Drug suffered sub-
stantial loss but was denied recompense by the Supreme
Court because it was not a shareholder under the
"purchaser-seller" rule judicially engrafted onto section
lO(b).
1 56
To the Blue Chip Court, section 10(b) was so rigidly directed
to deception in actual securities transactions that could-be, would-
be participants in such a securities trade would consequently be
denied 10(b) recovery because they had not yet actually engaged in
such a transaction. True, the participants were deceived in con-
nection with a potential securities transaction, but the participants
never actually traded.
Obviously, with this rigidity, Blue Chip would never counte-
nance coverage of one who was in no way involved in a securities
trade but was the victim of a theft totally unrelated to securities.
Judge Luttig continued, quoting Blue Chip: "[T]he wording of §
10(b), making fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity a violation of the Act, is surely badly strained when con-
strued to provide a cause of action, not to purchasers and sellers of
securities, but to the world at large."1' 7
153. Id. at 948 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
508 U.S. 286,305 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
154. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
155. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 (emphasis added).
156. Bayne, Essence, supra note 7, at 327-28.
157. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 952 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733 n.5).
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The Fourth Circuit summarized the scope of section 10(b) by
tying the essential "deception" directly to the actual securities
transaction. Here is the sine qua non of 10(b) liability: "Section
10(b) is not concerned with the general fairness of securities trans-
actions themselves, so long as there is no evidence of deception in
connection with a securities transaction, in the form of material
misrepresentations or omissions made to persons connected with a
securities transaction.""15
Judge Luttig capped it off with the Supreme Court in the 1971
case Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty:5 9
"[I]n Bankers Life the Court stated its understanding that section
10(b) only 'bar[red] deceptive devices and contrivances in the pur-
chase or sale of securities."'1"6
b. the nonconformity of the Theory
Judge Luttig shows commendable insight in his dissection of
the Theory's treatment of "in connection with" a securities trans-
action. In two paragraphs midway in his opinion, he compresses a
superb analysis of the deviousness of the Theory.
In his first paragraph, he exposes a dichotomy made by the
Theory where section 10(b) permits no such dichotomy at all. "In
essence, the misappropriation theory. . .artificially divides into
two discrete requirements-[1] a fiduciary breach and [2] a pur-
chase or sale of securities-the single indivisible requirement of
deception upon the purchaser or seller of securities."
16 1
What has the judge said? One, that section 10(b) "requires"
that the nondisclosure occur during the actual securities trade and
upon the trader. The deception is integral to the transaction.
Second, he says that the Theory breaks up this unitary re-
quirement of deception in a trade into two unconnected, unrelated
disparate acts: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty to an employer-
called "fraud"-and (2) a later, honest, nondeceptive sale of secu-
rities totally distinct from the prior act of disloyalty.
Thus, (1) Butch Bryan was unfaithful to the lottery by stealing
the news of the supplier contract and (2) later bought VLC stock
without regard to any duty or fairness to the sellers.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
160. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 n.17 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
161. Id. at 950.
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Examine this absurd example: A thieving employee is fully li-
able for securities "fraud" in spite of the fact that the predicate
and subsequent and totally unrelated "securities transaction" was
altogether lacking in deceit, was characterized by full disclosure,
and was completely above board. So it would be under the The-
ory.
In the second paragraph of Judge Luttig's dissection he builds
on his analysis of the fallacious dichotomy: "In [the false dichot-
omy], the theory effectively eliminates the requirement that a per-
son in some way connected to a securities transaction be deceived,
allowing conviction not only where the 'defrauded' person has no
connection with a securities transaction, but where no investor or
market participant has been deceived."162  Unfortunately Judge
Luttig's shotgun style again makes for difficult reading, but have
no doubts, he supports all of his arguments, albeit in unconnected
places.
Earlier, the opinion points out this false dichotomy when the
Theory removes any deceit from the trade itself. "[The 10(b) de-
ception] (i.e., the misappropriation) is deemed to be [in the words
of section 10(b)] 'in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] se-
curity,' because the misappropriated information is thereafter used
in a securities transaction."' And again, at another point in the
opinion: "The fraud was 'in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security,' because Bryan subsequently used the mis-
appropriated confidential information in the purchase of shares."' 64
Recall that the definition of the Theory, crystallized in the
Ninth Circuit case SEC v. Clark,65 by design separated the theft
from any obligation or relation to the trading innocents: One who
misappropriates information is liable if the person then "(3) uses
that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of
whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded
stock."'16  Once again, Judge Luttig recurs to Chestman: "The
source of the nonpublic information [the defrauded one] need not.
• .be in any way connected to or even interested in the purchase
or sale of securities." 167
162. Id.
163. Id. at 944-45.
164. Id. at 945 (emphasis added).
165. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
166. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir.
1990)).
167. Id. (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,567 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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The court, in this regard, shows its mastery of the "somewhat
harrowing evolution"1'6 of the Theory by directly repudiating sev-
eral holdings "of our sister circuits." In light of the expos6 of this
dichotomy,
[it should come .as no surprise that the provision [section
10(b)] is unconcerned with the fairness of conduct toward per-
sons such as family members [Chestman], employers [Bryan,
Carpenter, Materia, Newman], medical patients [Willis], or
other parties to the infinite number of similar trust relation-
ships [Clark] who are not in any way connected with or even
interested in a purchase or sale of securities.
19
The Fourth Circuit concludes its refutation of this last of the
Antitheses by a summary indictment of the unjustified dichotomy
propounded by the Theory. "The misappropriation of information
from an individual who is in no way connected to, or even inter-
ested in, securities is simply not the kind of conduct with which the
securities laws, as presently written, are concerned."'7
With that, the Fourth Circuit addresses all four Antitheses in
globo as a concluding word:
In light of the Court's consistent interpretation of section
10(b) as prohibiting only the deception, by material mis-
representation or omission of a purchaser or seller of se-
curities, or of a person in some way connected with or
having a stake in an actual or proposed purchase or sale




168. Id at 953.
169. Id. at 952-53. The references are to United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Willis, 825 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
170. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
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IV. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The government proceeded against Bryan under the so-
called "misappropriation theory" of securities fraud liability, a
theory that, although novel to this circuit, has been embraced
by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
-United States v. Bryan72
The impact of Bryan should be immense. The Age of En-
lightenment, 1984-1994, produced a virtually unmitigated attack by
the Theory on the basic tenets of the section 10(b) deceit ap-
proach. Bryan is the first crack in this monolith, and offers a pal-
pable hope for an early solution, either by the circuits themselves
or eventually the Supreme Court.
The conflict engendered by Bryan is, moreover, uncompli-
cated, almost black and white. Consider the Fourth Circuit itself.
In United States v. ReBrook,'73 the companion to Bryan, written by
Judge Williams, the outspokenly strong holding by Judge Luttig
was bolstered considerably: "Our straightforward reasoning in
Bryan is equally applicable to ReBrook. As the excerpted portion
of Bryan makes clear, we have rejected the misappropriation theory
as envisioned by our sister circuits in whole, not simply as applied
to the particular facts in Bryan."'74
Add as evidence of the solidarity of the Fourth, the unani-
mous rejection en banc of a rehearing. The circuit apparently was
without dissent in "the panel's view that the misappropriation the-
ory is never valid."'75 Clearly, the Fourth Circuit was spoiling for a
fight.
One of the rare commentaries on Bryan-in The New York
Times-emphasized this combativeness and was seemingly some-
what disedified by Judge Luttig's aggressive assault on the Second
Circuit:
The ruling by Judge Luttig was unusual for the scorn it
heaped on opinions by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which originated the theory and which, being based
in New York, has historically been the lead court on se-
172. Id at 943.
173. 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995).
174. Id. at 966 (emphasis added).
175. Full Fourth Circuit Will Not Hear Misappropriation Case, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) at 3 (Aug. 30, 1995) (emphasis added).
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curities issues. He said the Second Circuit was
"seemingly unaware" of an earlier Supreme Court deci-
sion [Santa Fe Industries], although that decision had been
on a case appealed from the Second Circuit. He said that
'it is virtually impossible to discern the logic' in another
Second Circuit opinion [Moss v. Morgan Stanley] on the
issue.
176
The Times might have added: "In the very next misappropriation
case it decided after Newman, the Second Circuit, perhaps unwit-
tingly, perhaps not, undermined the entire rationale behind the
misappropriation theory."' But the fifth article in this series,
Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory,' in 1994 was equally
scornful:
[O]ne would naturally ask how the same respected Sec-
ond Circuit could hand down a generally well-reasoned
and balanced Opinion such as [SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur] to say nothing of both Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch and
the Second Circuit Chiarella-and later, on a question on
all fours, do an abrupt about-face and release the unten-
able holding of the Meskill Majority [in Chestman]. The
question is intensified with the realization that both
[Texas Gulf Sulphur] and Chestman were en banc Opin-
ions.
171
Only three circuits, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth, are lined
up against the Fourth. The position of all three has coalesced into
a consensus of the definition of the Theory. Judge Luttig, as chief
spokesman for the Fourth, impugned vigorously and successfully,
each of the four subdivisions of the Theory in his Antitheses.
The other circuits, therefore-or the Supreme Court per-
176. Floyd Norris, Court Curtails Insider Trading Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
1995, at D1, D8. The Times referred to these strong statements in the opinion:
We regard the somewhat harrowing evolution of the misappropriation theory
as almost a testament to the theory's invalidity. When the Second Circuit first
adopted the theory fourteen years ago in affirming a criminal conviction for
securities fraud, that court was unattuned to the differences in language em-
ployed in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and was seemingly unaware of the exis-
tence of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries.
Id. at D8.
"It is virtually impossible to discern the logic behind the Moss court's dis-
tinction of Newman. This is due to what appears to be a double-misreading of foot-
note one from the Newman opinion." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 956 n.23.
177. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 955 (emphasis added).
178. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 107 (citations omitted).
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haps-will have a brightly limned quaterna of questions facing
them, at least regarding the Theory itself. True, the other Insider
Trading issues will soon arise and should.
A. The Vigor of the "Sister Circuits"
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, no solid phalanx is aligned in
opposition. Rather, the appearance is one of a tattered army in re-
treat, in spite of the uniformity of the embrace of the Theory.
1. The Third Circuit
The Second Circuit, the chief protagonist of the Theory, tried
vigorously to interpret the Third Circuit Rothberg v. Rosenbloom
179
into the ranks of cases supporting the Theory. "[T]he misappro-
priation theory has not yet been the subject of a Supreme Court
holding, but has been adopted in the Second, Third, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits.""18
However, as Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory'
concluded: "Substantively-or procedurally-Rothberg should af-
ford slight solace to the Chestman camp....1
Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory' did accord Roth-
berg the dignity-probably undeserved in the light of Luttig's con-
tempt-of a two-page analysis2 in its treatment of The Age of
Enlightenment: 1984-1994.
Judge Luttig gave Rothberg shorter shrift, and refused even to
list the Third Circuit as a supportive circuit. "As do many of the
courts that have addressed the misappropriation theory, the gov-
ernment also identifies the Third Circuit as having adopted the
theory, citing Rothberg. . . . The court in Rothberg, however,
merely adverted to the theory in a single sentence, and even then,
not by name."' 3 The Third Circuit clearly does not belong in the
tattered army.
2. The Ninth Circuit
In 1990 Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall wrote the only Ninth
179. 771 F.2d 818-(3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
180. U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,566 (2d Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted).
181. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 137.
182. See id at 136-37.
183. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omit-
ted).
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Circuit contribution to the Theory, SEC v. Clark. "4 Chestman and
the 'Misappropriation Theory' characterized the holding:
"Therewith ensued the most remarkable-at least to one who has
read the long series of insider-trading cases from Strong v. Repide
in 1909 to the Circuit Dirks in 1982-contortion and corruption of
the original protections afforded by Section 10(b). . . .The Court
seemed rambling and lost."'85
The Ninth Circuit-with allowance for the fact that Clark was
its sole contribution-did rank as a firm proponent of the Theory.
The reasoning of Clark, however, should not offer much pause to
the other circuits. Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory'
reviews Clark with adequate thoroughness.
3. The Seventh Circuit
In 1991 SEC v. Cherif8 6 was the only Theory case coming out
of the Seventh Circuit. Cherif, however, showed less conviction,
and expressed a genuine worry. "Cherif wondered if the Theory
'should apply even to "mere" thieves'-thieves, that is, sans a fi-
duciary duty,"' and thus did undermine the Theory's insistence on
the breach of a "duty. . .of trust and confidence."'8 "If 'mere'
thieves, perhaps mere eavesdroppers, mere bystanders, any per-
son?""' 9 Cherif was indeed uncertain about the Theory's require-
ment of a fiduciary relationship.
The Seventh Circuit, with the Ninth Circuit, therefore, offers
but thin support for the Theory. Virtually the entire burden for
the Theory must be carried by the Second Circuit.
4. The Second Circuit
The Theory began with Newman9 ' in 1981 in the Second Cir-
cuit and reached its zenith-or nadir-with the Second Circuit de-
cision in Chestman'9' in 1991. In between were several less impor-
tant cases. With the input of these lesser cases quite
inconsequential, the role of Theory representative falls principally
onto Chestman. Moreover, "[t]he Supreme Court has yet to ad-
184. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
185. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 138.40.
186. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
187. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 142.
188. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added).
189. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 142.
190. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
191. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
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dress whether the misappropriation theory is reconcilable with the
language and purposes of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, having
evenly divided on the validity of a conviction based on this theory
in Carpenter v. United States."' 2
Thus, as the latest and most important, Chestman will face off
against Bryan as the other Circuits are forced to take sides.
Chestman is indeed the ideal voice to speak for the decade
since Chiarella and Dirks of the early 1980s. Not only was
Chestman the pronouncement of the prestigious Second Cir-
cuit, but it was also an en banc Opinion of all eleven sitting
Judges. Certiorari was denied in 1992. Chestman approaches
Supreme Court stature.193
Predictably, Chestman will offer little competition to Judge Lut-
tig's Bryan.
Chestman, moreover, was the epitome of dissonance. The
eleven Judges were divided into a six-five split. The majority
Opinion by Meskill, reversing the District Court, was a mish-
mash. The dissent by Judge Winter was divisively compelling.
Two Judges added to the confusion with third and fourth
opinions. Note too that the six-five split was a reversal of an
earlier three-Judge Second Circuit panel, which itself had
three separate opinions. (In this disarray,. .14. perhaps better,
the Meskill Majority. And the Winter Five.)
Judge Luttig-more sanguine than Chestman and the
'Misappropriation Theory'--saw early signs of hedging in Chest-
man. He instanced several hesitancies to a full embrace of the
Theory, as when the Meskill Majority backtracked: "For these
reasons we tread cautiously in extending the misappropriation
theory to new relationships, lest our efforts to construe Rule 10b-5
lose method and predictability, taking over 'the whole corporate
universe.". 9 5 Judge Luttig also stressed the fact that Chestman re-
fused to grant recovery because a husband owes no fiduciary duty
to his wife. "Even though Judge Meskill may well be a bachelor,
even a bachelor could scarce be excused this sentiment."'96
"In sum, more than the gratuitous reposal of a secret to an-
192. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 943 (citations omitted).
193. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 82.
194. Id. at 83.
195. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 959 (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567, in turn quoting
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir. 1978)).
196. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 149.
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other who happens to be a family member [read "wife"] is required
to establish a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confi-
dence." 7
The chasm that divides the Fourth Circuit Bryan and the The-
ory of the Second Circuit is profoundly deep. It would be difficult
to divine a more auspicious moment for the uncommitted circuits
to embrace Bryan.
V. THE BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE
In embarking on this assessment of the future in the battle of
United States v. Bryan against the forces of the Theory, first review
the unusual concatenation of events that provided Judge J. Mi-
chael Luttig with the unparalleled opportunity he so ably seized.
Both bench and bar have much to learn from the scenario in Bryan
when next facing section 10(b) Insider Trading litigation.
A. The Appeal from the District Court
For a Judge Luttig so desirous of permanently eliminating the
Theory, a congeries of fortunate factors made success almost cer-
tain. First, luckily, Butch Bryan appealed-a virtually hopeless
endeavor-from a conviction for Insider Trading and, in a fortui-
tous amalgam, mail fraud, wire fraud, and perjury. With this ill-
advised appeal, the hoped-for attack on the Theory became possi-
ble. Add to this the equally helpful fact that Butch was patently
guilty on all four counts, guilty, that is, if the Theory were appli-
cable.
This felicitous amalgam offered Judge Luttig the glorious
chance of not only throwing out the Theory but sending Butch into
longtime custody-where he remains to this day-and even
avoiding as well any opprobrium or twinge of conscience had a re-
versal served to set Butch free. Here was a risk-free assault on the
Theory, since the other counts would remain to deal with Butch.
Second, the Department of Justice, undoubtedly counseled by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and committed by ne-
cessity to the cause of the Theory, misguidedly moved for an en
banc rehearing.
Ordinarily, this could cause some concern, but Judge Luttig
had clearly been thorough in anticipating what pitfalls might lie
ahead. Witness his own unanimous panel, and the equally unani-
197. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (emphasis added).
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mous.ReBrook holding of Judge Williams. Judge Luttig must have
caucused well, and been assured that the en banc circuit would
oblige with a door-closing denial of a rehearing, again apparently
unanimously.
Next, the Justice Department at last paused and took stock of
its position. What it saw was chastening: (1) an absolutely devas-
tating opinion by Judge Luttig, (2) unqualified Fourth Circuit
backing, and (3) a debilitated Theory with a "somewhat harrowing
evolution.""19
With that, the Justice Department expectably concluded that
certiorari would be adding another setback to an already unnerv-
ing defeat. The time for a petition was sensibly allowed to lapse.
This is the present that cautions the future. Perhaps The
Awakening, 1995 will be an added admonition. And what message
does Bryan and the nuances of The Awakening, 1995 send to each
of the principal players of the future: to the courts, to the com-
mission, and to the bar?
1. To the courts
Again showing his grasp of the impact of the Theory and its
peculiar place in the law, Judge Luttig offered some penetrating
insights with an eye to post-Bryan adjudications.
First, the judge consciously and correctly countered the view-
with-alarm that would expectably follow an abrupt disappearance
of the Theory. His prescience had anticipated the concerns of the
Attorney General who, the Times reported, was fearful of the con-
sequences of such a sudden vacuum: "[T]he Justice Department
said earlier this month that the opinion, if it were accepted in other
jurisdictions, 'would substantially cripple the commission's efforts
to protect investors and the integrity of the securities markets
against insider trading."'
199
Judge Luttig's opinion also countered the unwarranted timor-
ousness of "William McLucas, the S.E.C.'s chief of enforcement."
"'It would raise some problems,' Mr. McLucas said in an inter-
view. 'It is hard to overestimate the number of cases or the poten-
tial damage' if the doctrine2 Qhe invalidity of the Theory] became
widely accepted, he added."
To the contrary, Judge Luttig realized that seventy-five years
198. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953.
199. Norris, supra note 176, at D1.
200. Id at D8.
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of deceit actions still stood ready to meet any demands for Insider
Trading redress.
We do not believe that rejection of the particular misappro-
priation theory that we address today will ultimately have a
notable impact on federal efforts to combat fraud in the secu-
rities markets. Much of the conduct rendered criminal under
the misappropriation theory is already criminalized under
section 10(b) as interpreted in Chiarella and Dirks."'
Bryan is saying that the demise of the Theory will leave the courts
exactly where they were post-Dirks and that the law post-Dirks
was eminently capable of fighting securities deceit under the can-
onized deceit law of section 10(b), unaided by the fallacies of the
Theory.
Many of the people who would fall within the ambit of the
misappropriation theory urged in this case already owe a duty
to purchasers and sellers of securities to disclose or abstain
from trading, duties recognized by the Supreme Court in Chi-
arella and Dirks as legitimate predicates for criminal liability
under section 10(b).2
This is not to ignore, however, the past. The elimination of the
Theory, and a return to the post-Dirks period, would still leave all
the old problems extant, as readily solvable as they are.
Do not forget that it was the chaos in the law that spawned the
Theory in the first place: The courts (1) had never correctly de-
fined an Insider, (2) had been confused with the disclose or abstain
rule, (3) had injected a fiduciary duty into a deceit action, and (4)
had never answered the "tipper" and "tippee" questions of Dirks.
Because of all this, the Theory arose in desperation. These prob-
lems are still present.
But all these questions were classical deceit action questions.
They were the creation of courts unable to penetrate to the ten-
able philosophy underpinning the traditional law of section 10(b).
Judge Luttig is implicitly saying that future courts can now be
free-with the model of Bryan to guide them-to address these
questions and get the historical Insider Trading law back on the
track. Arguably, the basic philosophy laid out in Essence, and the
answers advanced in the several articles thereafter, will serve as a
basis for the answers.
201. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953.
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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a. the Second Circuit
Judge Luttig had no doubt that the Second Circuit would be
the primary battleground. There the Theory began, and there lies
Bryan's principal opposition.
If the Second Circuit could see the error of its ways, the rea-
soning would go, perhaps, then, the Supreme Court need never to
be called upon, and the circuits themselves could resolve the issue
on their own. If Bryan could so forcefully dissuade a petition for
certiorari in the Fourth Circuit, why not a similar approach and a
parallel opinion in the Second Circuit?
With this realization, Judge Luttig necessarily chose his own
Chestman to carry his message to the Second Circuit. He had
concluded, somewhat wishfully perhaps, that the Second was al-
ready loosening its embrace of the Theory: "Despite the momen-
tum building behind the theory with its rehabilitation in Materia,
and its adoption in Clark and Cherif, the pendulum in the Second
Circuit swung decidedly against the misappropriation theory in
that court's recent en banc decision in United States v. Chest-
man."
, 20 3
The judge was convinced that the Second Circuit already
knew in its heart that the Theory was untenable. He hoped that
the encouragement of Bryan would now make the Second's con-
version a reality, that the "Winter Five" would prevail.
For the first time since Moss, the Second Circuit attempted in
Chestman to square the misappropriation theory with the Su-
preme Court's holdings in Santa Fe Industries, Chiarella, and
Dirks, and not surprisingly, realized that the misappropriation
theory was neither necessary, defensible under precedent, sus-
ceptible in principle to limitation, nor justifiable on the strength
of the broad purposes of the Act.2 4
Strong words to level at the august Second Circuit. He continued
with a point all too obvious:
Chestman expressly recognized that the framework for
securities fraud established by the Supreme Court over
the past twenty-five years does not permit of the misap-
propriation theory as developed in the Second Circuit...
[T]he circuit belatedly acknowledged [in Chestman] that
to establish criminal liability under the Supreme Court's
203. Id. at 958.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
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cases, "the predicate act of fraud must be traceable to a
breach of duty to the purchasers or sellers of securities.'" 205
Chestman even admitted that the legitimacy of the traditional de-
ceit theory of Insider Trading liability had been established in Chi-
arella and Dirks, and that the Misappropriation Theory was only a
"second general theory of Rule 10b-5 liability."2
The judge could not resist a bit more scorn in a parting word:
"Ironically, we could scarcely describe better the tenuousness of
the misappropriation theory under Santa Fe Industries, Chiarella,
and Dirks, than did the Second Circuit itself in Chestman."27 But,
scorn withal, this should be a useful admonitory word of encour-
agement to the Second Circuit to return to sanity.
b. all the other circuits
With the Theory no longer a hindrance, Bryan should be rep-
licated in the remaining circuits. The Seventh Circuit, with only
"mere thieves" Cherif, and the Ninth Circuit, with only Hall's
Clark, have little backpedaling to do and should now be embold-
ened to follow Bryan verbatim.
This would clear the way for successive attacks on the several
troubled areas already besetting the law, pre-Theory. Soon a se-
ries of decisions like Bryan should lead back to the pristine days of
Cady, Roberts and its progeny.0
c. the Supreme Court
This Blueprint for the Future might well have no role for the
Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit and Bryan are so admirably
strong, the Second Circuit so hopelessly mixed up, and the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits so wholly enfeebled that the Theory should
slowly evanesce without Supreme Court assistance.
After that, each disability now afflicting the traditional law
could be removed in a rapid succession of reinvigorated opinions
on the district level. Then the Supreme Court could let the circuits
solve the problems undisturbed.
205. Id (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir.
1991)).
206. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566).
207. Id. The opinion goes on to quote at length from Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566-
67.
208. See generally Bayne, Misappropriation Theory, supra note 2, at 93-135
(discussing the Misappropriation Theory and securities fraud).
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2. To the commission
The message of Bryan is clear. Stop pandering to the illogical
Theory, join Judge Luttig and clear the courts of all the Theory de-
tritus.
Return to your roots. In memory of Chairman Cary, resurrect
his excellent Cady, Roberts, "a case of first impression"' ' and the
linchpin of the successful section 10(b) cases of the 1960s and
1970s. Attack the remaining errors that burden the traditional law
imposed by some of the errant Cady, Roberts progeny.
3. To the bar
If all these prognostications are realized, plaintiffs' counsel,
whether commission or the securities bar, should be loathe to
frame a case based on the Theory. The result will be a return to
Texas Gulf Sulphur, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, and the Second Cir-
cuit Chiarella. That should speed the Return to Reason, 1996 et
seq.
As for future defendants, should the Theory be foolishly em-
ployed, the outcome is readily conjectured: (1) If the Theory
should inconceivably prevail on the district and circuit levels, the
Supreme Court will certainly grant certiorari, and Bryan will then
enjoy its final victory, or (2) if defeat of the Theory is uniform, the
Demise of the Theory will thus be realized. The coup de grace will
have at last been struck.
VI. EPILOGUE
Surely, the coming years will reflect on the greatness of Judge
J. Michael Luttig and his Bryan opinion, and his success in effect-
ing The Awakening: 1995.210
209. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907 (1961).
210. After this Article went to press, the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) reiterated Bryan and added forceful support to
the condemnation of the Misappropriation Theory. A full commentary on O'Hagan
has been begun for early publication.
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